dc.description.abstract |
Various industrial sectors of Bangladesh are growing rapidly and contributing to the
economic development in recent years. Effluents and emissions of these factories pollute
the surrounding environment repeatedly even though the Department of Environment
(DoE) monitor the pollution standards and enforce strict compliance of the pollution control
measures. An exploratory analysis was carried out on water pollution of Bangladesh
focusing on the geographical representation of environmental fines, the difference of fines
for the textile sector from fines of other sectors, the similarity of violations, and measures
for repeat offenders. This study evaluated whether punitive measures were causing any
changes in polluters’ behavior to comply with existing regulations and concluded that the
environmental fines imposed by DoE were arbitrary. However, the data was sampled from
newspaper-reported sources and may not represent the holistic nature of the problem. It is
imperative to evaluate the enforcement measures, the number of fines of offenders, and the
distribution of fines by analyzing authentic historical data from DoE for a significant
period. The objectives of this empirical study are to analyze the current and historical trend
of pollution fines, assess the deterrence created by fines, and determine the effectiveness
of the Polluters Pay Principle (PPP) in Bangladesh. Data on fines from 2010 to 2018 was
collected from the DoE. SPSS, a standard statistical software package, was used to prepare
the database for conducting analysis. Standard descriptive statistics (mean, median,
percentiles, and quartiles) were used to characterize the environmental fine data. t-tests
were applied to assess the differences in fines between different groups (sectors, type of
violation, etc). Analysis of means and variances for different groups were carried out to
determine the disparities in levied fines. The historical trends of fines were assessed using
time-series analysis. After performing the relevant statistical tests, analysis of the test
results was carried out and presented in graphical and tabular form. Critical analysis and
comparison with standards were carried out to provide policy guidelines. Data of fines vary
significantly. A large difference was observed between mean and median, minimum and
maximum fines along with their standard deviations indicating the arbitrariness of imposing
fines. Industries like Textile and fabrics, Real estate and construction, Brick Kiln and Other
Private organizations were fined maximum times (i.e. 78%). Industries of Dhaka Division
have experienced the maximum cases of violations (79%) and therefore needs a separate
enforcement strategy. Textile and non-textile factories were fined differently, but effective
enforcement could not be achieved. Time series analysis for the type of factories and
violation across the observation period projects an irregular pattern. Violations in
subsequent years do not portray the effectiveness of the enforcement measures. There was
no difference in fines for all types of repeat offenders. Therefore, deterrence could not be
achieved. Modification of the traditional enforcement system or adoption of alternative
regulatory strategies is needed. PPP is partially implemented in Bangladesh. Revision of
traditional monitoring, enforcement systems and alternative regulatory strategies may be
adopted. Frequent monitoring and enforcement strategy for Textile factories should be
continued by DOE. Textiles industries must have functional ETPs. Repeat offenders should
be penalized differently to achieve deterrence. PPP should be effectively applied in
Bangladesh like other countries. Revision of policy guidelines and strengthening with
required manpower will enable DoE to implement PPP effectively. |
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